Working memory and working attention: What could possibly evolve?

The concept of “working” memory is traceable back to nineteenth century theorists (Baldwin, 1894; James 1890) but the term itself was not used until the mid-twentieth century (Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960). A variety of different explanatory constructs have since evolved which all make use of the working memory label (Miyake & Shah, 1999). This history is briefly reviewed and alternative formulations of working memory (as language-processor, executive attention, and global workspace) are considered as potential mechanisms for cognitive change within and between individuals and between species. A means, derived from the literature on human problem-solving (Newell & Simon, 1972), of tracing memory and computational demands across a single task is described and applied to two specific examples of tool-use by chimpanzees and early hominids. The examples show how specific proposals for necessary and/or sufficient computational and memory requirements can be more rigorously assessed on a task by task basis. General difficulties in connecting cognitive theories (arising from the observed capabilities of individuals deprived of material support) with archaeological data (primarily remnants of material culture) are discussed

Earworms ("stuck song syndrome"): towards a natural history of intrusive thoughts

Two studies examine the experience of “earworms”, unwanted catchy tunes that repeat. Survey data show that the experience is widespread but earworms are not generally considered problematic, although those who consider music to be important to them report earworms as longer, and harder to control, than those who consider music as less important. The tunes which produce these experiences vary considerably between individuals but are always familiar to those who experience them. A diary study confirms these findings and also indicates that, although earworm recurrence is relatively uncommon and unlikely to persist for longer than 24 hours, the length of both the earworm and the earworm experience frequently exceed standard estimates of auditory memory capacity. Active attempts to block or eliminate the earworm are less successful than passive acceptance, consistent with Wegner’s (1994) theory of ironic mental control

Less-is-more effects without the recognition heuristic

Inferences consistent with “recognition-based” decision-making may be drawn for various reasons other than recognition alone. We demonstrate that, for 2-alternative forced-choice decision tasks, less-is-more effects (reduced performance with additional learning) are not restricted to recognition-based inference but can also be seen in circumstances where inference is knowledge-based but item knowledge is limited. One reason why such effects may not be observed more widely is the dependence of the effect on specific values for the validity of recognition and knowledge cues. We show that both recognition and knowledge validity may vary as a function of the number of items recognized. The implications of these findings for the special nature of recognition information, and for the investigation of recognition-based inference, are discusse

Fast and frugal framing effects?

Three experiments examine whether simple pair-wise comparison judgments, involving the “recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit cues to the nature of the comparison required. Experiments 1 & 2 show that participants frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make “larger” judgments but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make “smaller” judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrates that, overall, participants consider recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the idea that, when making pair-wise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small

Modeling distributions of immediate memory effects: No strategies needed?

Many models of immediate memory predict the presence or absence of various effects, but none have been tested to see whether they predict an appropriate distribution of effect sizes. The authors show that the feature model (J. S. Nairne, 1990) produces appropriate distributions of effect sizes for both the phonological confusion effect and the word-length effect. The model produces the appropriate number of reversals, when participants are more accurate with similar items or long items, and also correctly predicts that participants performing less well overall demonstrate smaller and less reliable phonological similarity and word-length effects and are more likely to show reversals. These patterns appear within the model without the need to assume a change in encoding or rehearsal strategy or the deployment of a different storage buffer. The implications of these results and the wider applicability of the distributionmodeling approach are discussed

Auditory memory and the irrelevant sound effect: further evidence for changing state disruption

Four experiments investigate the hypothesis that irrelevant sound interferes with serial recall of auditory items in the same fashion as with visually presented items. In Experiment 1 an acoustically changing sequence of 30 irrelevant utterances was more disruptive than 30 repetitions of the same utterance (the changing-state effect; Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992) whether the to-be-remembered items were visually or auditorily presented. Experiment 2 showed that two different utterances spoken once (a heterogeneous compound suffix; LeCompte & Watkins, 1995) produced less disruption to serial recall than 15 repetitions of the same sequence. Disruption thus depends on the number of sounds in the irrelevant sequence. In Experiments 3a and 3b the number of different sounds, the "token-set" size (Tremblay & Jones, 1998), in an irrelevant sequence also influenced the magnitude of disruption in both irrelevant sound and compound suffix conditions. The results support the view that the disruption of memory for auditory items, like memory for visually presented items, is dependent on the number of different irrelevant sounds presented and the size of the set from which these sounds are taken. Theoretical implications are discussed